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ABSTRACT PAGE
Unconscious thought has long been theorized to play an important role in the creative 
process. Although this relationship has been extensively researched, the specific pathways 
leading from unconscious cognitive processes to useful creative output are still poorly 
understood. Thrash and Elliot (2003) have elaborated on inspiration as a psychological 
construct. The current study tests a mediational model in which inspiration mediates the 
relationship between unconscious thought and creative output using four conditions 
(control, conscious thought, 1-back, and 2-back). Preliminary analyses indicated a failure 
of the manipulation to influence unconscious thought, inspiration, or creativity. Further 
analyses supported the pattern of results predicted by the mediational model, such that 
attributions of an idea to unconscious thought predicted inspiration at the moment of 
getting an idea, which in turn predicted self-ratings of creativity of the completed story.
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1A mediational model of the creative process 
Historically, methodological constraints have limited research regarding the 
creative process to the description of cognitions present during menial creativity tasks. 
Although previous research has provided useful insight into cognitive processes involved 
in creativity, it has done little to characterize the specific pathways that lead from creative 
cognitions to tangible creative products. These pathways, largely unconscious and 
difficult to report, have guided researchers and theorists toward the goal of establishing a 
link between unconscious thought processes and creativity (Bowden & Jung Beeman, 
1998; Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2005; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Koestler, 1964; 
Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993).
Results from research by Dijksterhuis and colleagues (2006) supported this link. 
However, interpretations of these results are limited by the simplicity of the creativity 
tasks presented. These tasks, primarily focused on measures of divergent thinking or 
novel associations, are not of sufficient complexity to adequately describe the creative 
process. Although they do assess certain cognitions necessary for creativity, they do not 
assess or characterize the act of creation itself (i.e., writing a story, creating a work of art, 
developing a new scientific theory). As such, they assess only a very limited subset of the 
cognitive processes involved in creativity. Thus, these results paint an incomplete picture 
of the relationship between unconscious thought and the creative process and provide a 
limited description of the progression from cognition to actualized creative output. The 
present study seeks to establish a specific pathway between unconscious processes and 
creative output.
2Creativity
Creativity is the act o f bringing into being something original and meaningful.
The hallmarks of creative output are that it be useful, original, meaningful, and 
appropriate to the context in which it will be applied. Creativity is characterized as the 
generation of original ideas that transcend standard rules, relationships, norms and 
patterns {Oxford English Dictionary; 1989). Researchers have searched for a way to 
define the creative personality for decades, from seeking to identify personality traits 
associated with creative behavior to establishing the cognitive processes mediating 
creativity (Baer & Oldman, 2006; Kelly, 2006; Simonton, 1999; Weisberg, 2006; 
Wolfradt & Pretz, 2001). Simonton (1999) performed a meta-analysis o f the literature 
regarding creativity and personality and identified six clusters of findings. High levels of 
creativity are associated with intelligence, a cognitive style open to divergent ideas, 
openness to new experiences, a motivation to create, unusual behavior, lack of social 
interest, and schizophrenia-related symptomatology.
Similarly, Wycoff and Pryor (2003) showed that creative individuals exhibited a 
higher need for cognition and more use of humor, which they interpreted as the tendency 
for creative individuals to reffame threatening information and to seek out cognitively 
complex stimuli. Other studies have shown that creative behavior is unrelated to 
neuroticism (Martindale & Dailey, 1996), and that openness to experience and 
extraversion positively predict creative hobbies, creatively rated college majors, and peer- 
or expert-rated creative performance (Wolfradt & Pretz, 2001).
Indeed, after studying the relationship between personality traits and creative 
behavior, Wolfradt and Pretz (2001) identified openness as the only personality trait to 
predict creativity across fields of art, science, and a variety of hobbies. The researchers
3suggested that this result may have indicated a high degree of domain specificity 
regarding creativity, with openness serving as a common underlying trait that acts as a 
catalyst for individuals to excel in their chosen domain because of their acceptance of 
new ideas. Kelly (2006) found that, in addition to openness, extraversion was also a 
significant predictor of creativity. This finding is consistent with some previous research 
(Wolfradt & Pretz, 2001), although not as common a finding as the relationship between 
openness and creativity. Kelly (2006) interpreted this relationship between extraversion 
and creativity as a by-product of the equally strong relationship between extraversion and 
tolerance, which she defined as a general attitudinal quality of openness to others’ ideas 
and flexibility in thinking when comparing ideas. This interpretation is consistent with 
previous research showing that creativity was related to an increased ability to tolerate 
ambiguity (Sternberg, 1995). A heightened ability to tolerate ambiguity could help 
creative individuals evaluate new ideas, making them more likely to allow themselves to 
experience the uncertainty that occurs when challenging their own previously held ideas 
and adapting them to fit with new information.
Recent research has used new technology in neuroscience to identify specific 
structures and patterns of activation that underlie the creative process. Howard-Jones and 
colleagues (2005) used fMRI to identify activations of semantic divergence during a 
creative story generation task. During the creativity task, participants were required to 
incorporate three unrelated words into a story. In the uncreative condition, participants 
generated a story for three words that were obviously related to a single experience.
When participants were engaged in creative, as opposed to uncreative, activities, they 
demonstrated increased bilateral activity in the medial frontal gyri and left anterior
4cingulated cortex. The researchers suggested that this increased activation may be 
explained by the increased working load of creating novel associations, or by increased 
demands of episodic memory retrieval. In addition, creative tasks activated parts of the 
visual cortex, possibly indicating increased use o f visual imagery when completing an 
explicitly creative task.
Battacharya and Petsche (2005) observed significantly different cortical 
functioning in artists versus non-artists during a sketching task. Specifically, frontal 
cortical regions showed dominant activity in the right hemisphere of artists, but not non­
artists, possibly indicating extensive top-down processing and visual imagery during an 
artistic task. Grabner and colleagues (2007) showed similar right hemispheric activations 
for participant-generated ideas that were self-rated as “more original.” These studies 
show reliable brain activations during the creative process, and are a useful complement 
to cognitive and personality research in establishing that process as a distinct 
phenomenon.
Creativity and Unconscious Thought
The hypothesized relationship between unconscious thought and creativity has 
been the subject of extensive speculation and, more recently, empirical study 
(Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2005; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Kris, 1952; Lubart & Getz, 
1997; Wallas, 1926). Ideas about the exact nature of the relationship have evolved from a 
focus on the psychodynamic unconscious to include the cognitive processes involved in 
unconscious thought.
One of the earliest to attempt a theory o f creative thought was Wallas (1926), who 
proposed a four-stage process composed of preparation, incubation, illumination, and
5verification. The preparation stage takes place consciously and refers to the process of 
taking in adequate information regarding the specific area of creativity targeted. The 
incubation stage is a period of time in which the individual disengages from the creative 
process or objective. The illumination stage follows, and is characterized by an idea 
bursting into consciousness, otherwise known as the “Aha!” moment. The verification 
stage takes place consciously as well, and is characterized by the actualization or 
application of the idea resulting from the thought process (Wallas, 1926). Of particular 
interest here is the incubation stage, which implies an active process that takes places 
while attention is directed away from the information taken in during preparation, and is 
directly followed by an illumination event consisting of a creative idea. Wallas’s 
influential theory has directed creativity research for the past century, with particular 
attention paid to characterizing the processes that take place during the largely 
unconscious incubation stage.
Primary Process Thinking. Early references to the role o f the unconscious in the 
creative process emerged from the psychodynamic theories of Freud and Kris. Freud 
(1958) outlined primitive thinking. Also termed primary process thinking (Russ, 2001), 
these thought processes occur early in the developmental process. Primary process 
thinking is primal, present at birth, and possesses strongly associated affective 
components (Freud, 1966; Russ, 2001). As such, it operates independently of logical, 
lexical thinking processes, which develop later and are rooted in language-based 
mechanisms. This primitive thinking is characterized by the use of non-verbal imagery 
and considerable flexibility. Primary process thinking can be likened to the type of 
thinking present in dreams, which is often illogical, free of time/space orientation, and
6affect-laden (Russ, 2001). These definitions of primary process thinking imply two basic 
components: affective and cognitive (Russ, 2001). Holt (1977) proposed two types of 
properties that illustrate these components. Formal properties contain loose associations 
and condensed images, thus resembling the cognitive component proposed by Russ 
(2001). Content properties include affect-laden, aggressive, libidinal content that 
represents both the cognitive and affective components of primary process thinking.
Psychoanalytic theory has characterized primary process as possessing a property 
called mobility of cathexis, meaning that the energy surrounding and underpinning ideas 
and images is fluid and easily displaced. As such, this energy is not constricted to a 
specific idea or concept. Instead, it is freely circulating and promotes a wide scope of 
flexibly focused attention. This characteristic of primary process thinking facilitates a 
psychological state that allows interchangeable associations between all ideas, concepts, 
and images present in the mind. Indeed, Martindale (1989) posited that the freely 
associative nature o f primary process thinking increases the likelihood of discovering 
novel combinations of concepts. This property of primary process thinking is a necessary 
component of creativity, where ideas and concepts are in part defined by the novelty of 
the associations underpinning them.
Kris (1952) relied heavily on primary process thinking in his theory of regression 
in the service of the ego. This theory o f the origins of creativity elaborated on Freud’s 
description of primary process thinking, focusing on the importance of controlling 
primary process thought and integrating it with conscious, secondary processes. Kris 
asserted that creative individuals possess strong egos that are not easily threatened by the 
affect-laden, primitive, often aggressive desires of the unconscious (Kris, 1952). Thus,
7creative individuals are able to learn to harness and control their primary process thinking 
(Kris, 1952; Russ, 2001). These individuals can then regress to primary process modes of 
thought in a controlled fashion, returning to more rational thought processes as they 
desire. The ability to engage in controlled alternation between two modes of thought 
allows creative persons to evaluate the loose, primitive, affective associations formed 
during primary process thinking in a more logical context. The result of controlled 
regression is a pathway for the use of unconscious and unusual associations in logically 
evaluated creative outputs (Kris, 1952). Kris further postulated that control is the 
distinguishing factor between creative individuals and those individuals with disordered 
thought and psychopathology, who display similar patterns of regression in an 
uncontrolled manner.
Unconscious Thought. With the advent of the cognitive revolution, theories of 
unconscious influences on creativity moved from describing the psychodynamic 
unconscious to uncovering specific cognitive processes involved in creativity.
Dijksterhuis and colleagues (2004) began researching unconscious processes in decision 
making and creativity tasks and showed that unconscious processes may be superior to 
conscious processes under certain conditions. Their Unconscious Thought Theory 
outlines two modes of thought: conscious and unconscious. Dijksterhuis and Nordgren 
(2006) have proposed that these modes of thought are qualitatively different. As such, 
they are applicable to different circumstances.
Conscious thought is defined as cognitive or affective thought processes that 
occur with conscious attention directed at a specific object or task (Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006). Unconscious thought processes, while still object- and task-relevant,
8take place while conscious attention is being focused in another direction. Both modes of 
thought contain cognitive and affective aspects, but the key difference between the two 
modes is attention. Although the two processes are relatively independent, they 
continually function together. Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) outlined several key 
differences between conscious and unconscious thought that are relevant to the creative 
process.
Consciousness is generally constrained to completing one task at a time because 
of its relatively low processing capacity. Miller (1956) determined that the storage 
capacity of consciousness is about seven items. Conscious thought can process between 
10 and 60 bits per second according to some researchers. This processing capacity 
represents only a small fraction o f the total processing capacity that is possible with the 
entire human system. Wilson and Schooler (1991) showed that conscious thought, 
because of its highly limited capacity, led people to focus on a limited subset of attributes 
to the detriment of other relevant attributes. In their studies, participants evaluated and 
rated different categories of objects. Those participants instructed to carefully analyze the 
objects made less accurate evaluations than the participants who were merely instructed 
to casually evaluate the objects without directed thought or effort.
Dijksterhuis (2004) provided further evidence for the negative impact o f limited 
processing capacity when he presented participants with a large amount information 
about four apartments and asked them to pick the best one. He divided participants into 
two groups: a conscious thought group and an unconscious thought group. In the 
conscious thought group, participants were instructed to carefully analyze the information 
presented. In the unconscious thought group, participants completed a distraction task
9which prevented them from consciously focusing attention on the information presented. 
Dijksterhuis asserted that this distraction task paradigm forced participants to engage in 
unconscious thought for a period of time, during which unconscious cognitive processes 
continued to evaluate the information while attention was directed elsewhere. In line with 
the capacity principle, participants in the conscious thought group reported less holistic 
judgments than participants in the unconscious thought group. Additionally, unconscious 
thinkers chose the objectively superior apartment more often than both conscious thinkers 
and the immediate choice control condition. The capacity principle has implications for 
the creative process in addition to decision making processes. Specifically, low 
processing capacity could impede the formation of novel associations between 
tangentially related information that characterizes creative output.
Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) posited that unconscious thought operates 
aschematically. As such, it is not constrained by an already existing, highly structured, 
deeply entrenched schema. Rather, it is better at discovering a structure from information 
that is already present. Consciousness is guided by schemas and expectancies. As such, it 
generally seeks to incorporate information into existing patterns and previously held 
expectancies. Sloman (1991) outlined two distinct reasoning processes that mirror the 
two modes of thought in Dijksterhuis’ model. He stated that conscious, strategic thought 
processes possess an inherent hierarchical structure that automatic reasoning processes do 
not. Dijksterhius and colleagues suggested that the limited processing capacity of 
consciousness directly leads to more schema use. Indeed, using the same conscious 
versus unconscious thought paradigm, they showed that conscious thinkers more easily
10
resorted to the use o f racial stereotypes than unconscious thinkers when evaluating a new 
person (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006).
In contrast, unconscious thought is a slower process that integrates larger amounts 
of information into a more objective judgment without excessive limitation by existing 
organizational frameworks. Dijksterhuis (2004) further showed that, when provided with 
a consciously processed goal, unconscious thought can lead to enhanced memory with 
better organized categories. In fact, participants engaging in unconscious thought 
organized information about a potential roommate into logical clusters (i.e., intelligent 
behavior, extraverted behavior) without being informed of the clusters in advance. 
Dijksterhuis (2004) used these findings to determine that unconscious thought is an 
active, goal directed process that cannot be explained by mere set shifting or forgetting. 
Instead, it involves more consistent categorization of information into emergent 
categories that result in changes in the mental representations of objects (Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006).
This difference also has implications for the creative process. To the degree that 
unconscious thought provides a clearer, more comprehensive mental representation of 
information and objects, it could result in ideas that are not only novel but creatively 
useful as well. Conversely, to the degree that conscious thought provides representations 
that only fit into existing, rigidly held schemas, it could significantly inhibit novel, 
creative ideas.
The weighting principle states that the unconscious naturally weights information 
about various attributes of an object based on their relative importance. Wilson and 
Schooler (1991) argued that conscious thought disrupts this naturally occurring process
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and results in sub-optimal weighting. Wilson and colleagues showed that decisions made 
by conscious thinkers were often inconsistent and less satisfying over time, strongly 
adhered to, and wrong (Dijksterhuis & Van Olden, 2006; Wilson, Lisle, Schooler, 
Hodges, Klaaren, & LeFleur, 1993). Wilson et al. (1993) concluded that conscious 
thought forces people to place more weight on attributes that are easily accessible and 
verbalized while ignoring attributes that are more abstract. Dijksterhuis suggested that 
deliberation may actually be detrimental in the absence of a limited set of attributes that 
require a certain weighting. In terms of creativity, the weighting of a limited number of 
easily accessible, highly semantic attributes would inhibit the formation of novel 
associations using additional, more abstract and affective attributes.
Perhaps most relevant to the creative process, conscious thought processes are 
generally convergent whereas unconscious thought processes are divergent. As a result of 
the schema-focused, capacity constrained nature of consciousness, it is pressured to 
search for and categorize information in a way that will converge upon a single concept, 
idea, or category. Unconscious thought, as a result of its large processing capacity that 
remains unbound by existing rules or schemas, is more divergent. This principle speaks 
specifically to the role o f incubation in creativity. The idea that the unconscious is active 
even without direct attention has been a proposed component of creativity since Wallas 
(1926) theorized about the creative process. Indeed, many creative individuals describe a 
process in which their most creative ideas or solutions to problems occur at times when 
they are not actively thinking about the task or problem. This certainly characterizes 
unconscious thought as an active process that, perhaps through incubation, is able to
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process information in such a way that novel associations are formed using a larger pool 
of knowledge.
Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006) showed that unconscious thinkers produced more 
creative and divergent uses of a brick, and more divergent responses to a listing task. 
Although these studies address one facet o f creativity, they provide evidence for the 
superiority o f unconscious thought in creativity. Dijksterhuis’ and Nordgren’s (2006) 
theory of unconscious thought provides a useful framework from which to study the 
effects of different modes of thought on creativity. Although it outlines many reasons for 
the superiority o f unconscious thought in creative tasks, results of research thus far have 
established the link using tasks that assess only a very limited number of simple creativity 
tasks. As such, these results do little to elucidate what takes place during unconscious 
thought that specifically facilitates more creative output. It is possible that other cognitive 
processes linked to creativity could help to provide a more detailed explanation 
qualifying the relationship between unconscious thought and creativity.
Insight
Insight is defined as an unexpected solution to a problem that appears after an 
impasse, and has long been described as possessing qualities that are distinct from 
language and based in unconscious processes (Bowden & Jung Beeman, 1998; Koestler, 
1964; Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993; Wallas, 1926). Evidence for these processes 
comes from a variety o f sources, most notably from anecdotal reports by creative 
individuals and laboratory scientists, who recall solutions appearing suddenly after 
periods of distraction or wordless thought. Further information comes from experimental 
studies by Kaplan and Simon (1990), who reported that individuals successfully solving
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insight problems were unable to report critical steps in the problem solving process, 
primarily the sudden reorganizations o f information that seem to precede the appearance 
of a solution.
Insight problems have been extensively used in the study of both creativity and 
inspiration. An insight problem contains three necessary properties: it is within the 
competence of an average subject, it has a high probability of leading to an impasse, and 
has a high probability o f leading to a sudden appearance of a solution after periods of 
sustained effort or distraction (Bowden, Jung Beeman, & Fleck, 2005; Schooler, Ohlsson, 
& Brooks, 1993). Although these problems have been useful in establishing a cursory 
account of processes involved in insight, the results o f studies comparing insight and non­
insight problems should be interpreted with caution. Insight problems can be solved using 
processes unrelated to insight. The insights experienced during insight problem solving 
are not inherent components o f the problem itself, but rather result from specific types of 
thought patterns that may or may not be applied to the problem.
Early research into the cognitive mechanisms active during insight problems 
solving suggested the importance of unconscious thought in arriving at solutions. More 
recent research has characterized these unconscious processes as the result of spreading 
activation (Ohlsson, 1992; Schooler et al., 1993). Ohlsson (1992) proposed a model 
suggesting that information not directly related to an insight problem is activated in 
subawareness. This activation accumulates until it reaches a threshold of consciousness. 
During the accumulation phase, which takes place unconsciously or below the threshold 
of awareness, mental representations of a problem or object change. With each change in 
the representation comes a corresponding spreading activation down a new pathway
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away from the activation of the original information (Schooler et al., 1993). In this way, 
more remote information is activated to form a larger base of information in the 
unconscious. This process may directly facilitate the reorganizations and novel 
associations responsible for both insight and creativity. As such, it is qualitatively 
different from the analytical processes that are used during the conscious contemplation 
of a problem.
Indeed, Kounios and colleagues (2006) have used imaging techniques to show 
qualitative differences in brain activation during self-reported insight experiences when 
solving insight problems. Specifically, activity preceding the introduction of the problem 
predicted whether or not participants would solve the problem correctly. Further, both 
EEG and fMRI data showed increased activity in medial frontal and temporal areas 
before exposure to correctly solved problems (Kounios, et al., 2006). The authors 
suggested that this pattern of activation indicated preparation to strongly activate 
prepotent candidate solutions, and to prepare attention to switch to non-prepotent 
' solutions if necessary. In this way, insight preparation is able to prepare individuals to not 
unduly discount weak or distant solutions characterized by remote associations, a process 
that is essential in creativity tasks.
Seger, Glover, and Gabrieli (2000) used fMRI to study differential activation in 
cortical structures during a novel word generation task. Participants completed tasks 
requiring the generation of verbs that were either closely or distantly related to a given 
noun. Closely associated semantic items showed activation in the left inferior frontal lobe 
and right cerebellum. Distant associations between nouns and verbs produced identical 
activation in the left inferior frontal lobe and additional activations in the right prefrontal
15
cortex, left middle frontal gyrus, and bilateral activation in the cerebellum. The left 
inferior prefrontal cortex has been implicated in selection of items based on semantic 
properties. Interestingly, this activation remained unchanged during the generation of 
distant associations, with new areas being recruited to complete the task. The pattern 
observed in the generation of distant associations suggests that perhaps the function of 
the inferior prefrontal cortex is more important for identifying close semantic 
relationships, with additional areas needed to form more distant associations (Seger, 
Glover, & Gabrieli, 2000). The frontal gyrus and cerebellum have both been implicated 
in searching for correct responses. To the degree that searching for novel associations is 
more effortful, researchers asserted that activations in these areas during generation of 
distant associations is not surprising.
The right prefrontal cortex has been similarly implicated in insight processes 
central to the concept of inspiration. Goel and Vartanian (2005) identified differential 
activation between lateral and vertical set shifts in an insight task. Specifically, increased 
right prefrontal cortex activation was observed in lateral, but not vertical, set shifts. 
Further, a hypothesis generation task for solutions to the match problem showed 
significant activation in the left dorsolateral and right ventrolateral prefrontal cortices, 
indicating that both lateral and vertical set shifts are involved in the generation process. 
Additionally, comparisons of successfully versus unsuccessfully completed insight 
problems showed right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and left middle frontal gyrus 
activation. This pattern of activation indicates processes beyond that of mere insight, 
which is associated with the right hippocampus (Goel & Vartanian, 2005, Luo & Niki, 
2003). Thus, activations observed during lateral set shifts in insight problem solving
16
suggest additional processes that remain unexplained by activities observed in previous 
research on insight (Luo & Niki, 2003). It is possible that these additional activations 
could correspond with certain processes involved in inspiration, a link that has yet to be 
studied.
Interestingly, the patterns of right hemispheric activation seen in insight problem 
solving are similar to those found in the previously discussed study of neural processes in 
professional artists. These activations, corresponding largely with hard-to-verbalize, 
unconscious thought processes, suggest a similar mechanism underlying insight and 
creativity.
Inspiration
Thrash and Elliot (2003) have characterized inspiration as composed of three core 
characteristics: transcendence, evocation, and approach motivation. Transcendence is 
one’s awareness that a higher level of output can be achieved, and is characterized as 
integral in the processes of illumination and insight (Thrash & Elliot, 2003). Evocation 
refers to the tendency of inspiration to be experienced as an unwilled and evoked event. 
Inspiration is an experience attributed to a source other than the self, for which the self 
cannot take responsibility. Finally, inspiration is partially composed of an approach 
motivation, which is the force that compels individuals to transmit their inspired idea 
outward to others. Interestingly, inspiration is distinguishable from the approach- 
motivated positive affective state, which exhibits similar levels of approach motivation, 
but lower levels o f transcendence and evocation.
Researchers have suggested that inspiration serves the important function of 
transmitting or actualizing ideas or visions (Thrash & Elliot, 2003). The proposed
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relationships between transcendence, illumination, and insight are of particular relevance 
here. After insight forces an idea into consciousness, the resulting illumination triggers 
inspiration which provides a pressure to transmit that idea outward and to actualize the 
idea into a transmittable form. Thus, it seems that inspiration could play an important role 
in the creative process by pressing individuals to transform a novel, original, creative idea 
into a product that can be shared and useful. Inspiration has been largely ignored both in 
general psychological research and in the creativity literature.
These links within the construct of inspiration suggest a direct role for inspiration 
in the unconscious processes leading to creative output. More specifically, the necessity 
of the transcendence component o f inspiration in insight suggests that inspiration could 
play a similar role in creativity. Taken together, it is reasonable to propose a link between 
unconscious processes, inspiration, and the creative process. More specifically, 
inspiration could help describe the established, yet poorly understood, relationship 
between unconscious thought and creativity.
Thrash and Elliot (2003) established a link between inventors’ self-rated 
inspiration and their number of registered patents. Additionally, the number of patents 
was significantly related to the self-reported frequency of inspiration in patent holders. 
Furthermore, the study showed that patent holders reported experiencing inspiration more 
frequently and more intensely than a control group (Thrash & Elliot, 2003). Further 
support for the link between inspiration and creativity comes from several studies by 
Thrash and colleagues (manuscript in progress). Inspiration predicted peer-rated 
creativity in both scientific- and poetry-writing tasks when controlling for self-rated 
effort. A third study related self-reports of inspiration, effort, and positive affect (PA)
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while writing to the creativity o f completed stories as rated by English majors and 
American Studies graduate students. Creativity ratings were significantly positively 
correlated with both inspiration and PA, but not effort. A regression analysis revealed 
that only inspiration uniquely predicted ratings of creativity, p = 0.26, p<0.01.
This study also revealed interesting patterns in self-attributions of thought 
processes involved in the generation of ideas for the story writing process. In a regression 
analysis, effort and PA positively predicted the attribution of one’s ideas to conscious 
thought, whereas inspiration negatively predicted conscious thought attributions. Another 
regression showed that self-rated inspiration and PA positively predicted unconscious 
thought, whereas effort negatively predicted unconscious thought. These findings provide 
evidence of an extra step in the causal chain of the creative process. Namely, unconscious 
thought could make an individual more likely to experience inspiration and to produce 
output that is rated as more creative by themselves and others.
Based on the research outlined above, I hypothesized a mediational model of 
creativity. Specifically, I hypothesize that unconscious thought, when compared to 
conscious thought, would produce higher self-rated and peer-rated creativity o f a 
completed story writing task. I further posited that this process would be mediated by 
inspiration while generating an idea and completing the story-writing task. I tested this 
hypothesis by applying Dijksterhuis and colleagues’ (2006) distraction task paradigm to a 
story writing task in which participants complete a previously viewed story immediately 
or after engaging in either conscious or unconscious thought.
19
Method
Participants
One hundred and twenty-two undergraduates (64 females; mean age = 18.78, SD = 0.95) 
from the College of William and Mary participated in the experiment. They were 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions: a control condition (n = 31), a conscious 
thought condition (n = 32), a 1-back unconscious thought condition (n = 27), and a 2- 
back unconscious thought condition (n = 31). All participants provided informed consent 
prior to completion of the experiment and were granted course credit in exchange for 
participation. One participant in the 2-back unconscious condition was dropped due to a 
programming malfunction that interrupted the distraction task.
Procedure
Participants completed one hour-long experimental session. All instructions and 
stimuli were administered using a Dell computer and MediaLab ® software.
Participants completed a battery of initial measures assessing self-reports of 
writing experience and ability, personality traits, trait-level affect, and thinking style.
After the initial questionnaires, participants completed practice 1-back and 2-back tasks. 
Following Dijksterhuis and Meurs’ (2006) paradigm, n-back tasks were used to 
manipulate conscious versus unconscious modes of thought. An n-back task is a memory 
task in which participants are presented with a series of one-digit numbers one at a time. 
They are then asked if the presented digit is a “match” or “no match” to the digit that 
appears n digits before it (Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006; Jonides, Schumacher, Smith, 
Lauber, Awh, et al., 1997). For the 1-back task, participants were asked whether or not 
the presented digit matched the one that came before it (i.e., one digit back). For the 2-
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back task, participants were asked whether or not the presented digit matched the one that 
came two before it (i.e., two digits back; see Appendix 1 for the full description of n-back 
tasks as viewed by participants).
Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006) suggested that the cognitive resources needed to 
complete these tasks fully occupy conscious attention, thereby preventing conscious, 
focused thought. They further argued that this prevention of conscious thought actually 
promotes unconscious thought processes, a theory that has been supported by their 
findings in several studies of decision making and simple creative processes. Practice n- 
back sessions o f both 1- and 2-back tasks were included in all conditions to reduce the 
likelihood that unfamiliarity with the task during the actual unconscious thought period 
could cause frustration in the unconscious thought conditions. These practice sessions 
provided participants with feedback after every response and all participants were given 
the option to repeat each practice session until they understood the task.
Participants were introduced to the story writing task after completion of the 
practice 1 - and 2-back tasks. They first viewed instructions which informed them that 
they would have 30 seconds to read the first few sentences o f a story (see Appendix 2), 
after which they would have seven minutes to complete the story. Participants were 
provided with the beginning sentences of the story in an effort to standardize the content 
of the completed stories, thus making it easier to compare the creativity of the stories. In 
the control condition, participants were given seven minutes to complete the story 
immediately following their initial viewing of the first sentences of the story. In the 
conscious thought condition, participants were informed that they should take three 
minutes to think about and plan their story before writing. They were then shown a blank
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white screen for three minutes, after which they were given seven minutes to complete 
the story.
In the 1 -back unconscious thought condition, participants completed a three- 
minute version o f the 1-back task that they practiced earlier in the study, while 
participants in the 2-back unconscious thought condition completed a three-minute 
version of the 2-back task they had practiced earlier in the study. The n-back tasks were 
created to contain evenly distributed ratios of one match for every five non-matches 
throughout the entire task. This ratio corresponded with approximately one match for 
every five stimuli in the 1- and 2-back tasks. Within each subset of five stimuli, the 
location of the match was allowed to vary randomly. Each digit in the n-back tasks was 
presented in the center o f the computer screen for two seconds. Participants were then 
presented with a screen containing the options “Match” or “No Match,” and were asked 
to respond within five seconds of viewing the digit. Previous studies have used various n- 
back distraction tasks when manipulating conscious and unconscious thought in both 
decision making and creativity tasks (Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006; Jonides, Schumacher, 
Smith, Lauber, Awh, et al., 1997).
The decision to include both a 1- and 2-back task condition was made for multiple 
reasons. First, although the 2-back task has been used as a distraction task in previous 
research, the difficulty o f the task is likely to cause frustration in some participants. The 
1-back task was significantly less taxing during pilot sessions and was included to 
investigate potentially differential effects o f the distraction tasks on participants’ self- 
rated affect. Second, the 1-back task may not completely prevent conscious thought 
during the distraction period because it requires less cognitive resources, and may instead
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promote only a partial blockage o f conscious thought. The inclusion of this task allows a 
comparison of partially obscured conscious thought with a task that completely obscures 
conscious thought (the 2-back task). After these respective distraction tasks, participants 
in both the 1 -back and 2-back conditions were given seven minutes to complete their 
stories.
After the story writing task, participants completed questionnaires assessing affect 
at various points during the story writing task, reports o f idea modality, attribution, and 
self-ratings of inspiration, creativity, and effort in generating a story idea and writing the 
story, and self-appraisal of the idea and of the finished story.
Measures
Writing Experience. Participants first completed a 6-item self-report assessment 
of experience and perceived competence. Three items pertained to writing in general and 
three items addressed the writing of fictional stories specifically. Participants responded 
to all six items using a Likert scale ranging from one (Not at all experienced) to seven 
(Extremely experienced). Sample items include “How experienced are you with writing?”
NEO-FFI. The NEO-Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992) is 
a 60-item personality assessment providing measures of five established domains: 
extroversion (E), neuroticism (N), agreeableness (A), openness to experience (O), and 
conscientiousness (C). Six additional items from the NEO-Personality Inventory Revised 
Openness-Aesthetic sub-factor (NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992) were included in this 
study as they were particularly relevant to the study of creativity. Participants responded 
to the degree to which the items accurately described them using a five-point Likert scale 
(\=Strongly disagree, 5-Strongly agree).
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Affect. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988) was developed to assess two dominant and relatively independent 
dimensions of affect. We used to the PANAS to assess trait level positive affect (PA; 10 
items) and negative affect (NA; 10 items) at the beginning of the experimental session. 
Additionally, the PANAS was completed three times after the story writing task in order 
to assess state-level positive and negative affect at the time of getting an idea for a story, 
while writing the story, and at the end of the experimental session. Participants responded 
to the degree to which the items described what they were feeling at the specified time 
using a five-point Likert scale (1=Very slightly, 5 =Extremely).
Idea modality. All participants completed an 18-item measure o f modality twice 
after the story writing task: once regarding the modality in which the central idea 
appeared (visual, auditory, specific words, scents, phrases to be used, etc.) and again 
regarding the degree to which each item played a role in the story writing process. 
Participants responded to the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with each 
modality using a seven-point Likert scale (l-Strongly disagree, l=Strongly agree).
Idea and story appraisal. Participants completed a 27-item measure twice after 
the story completion task: once as an appraisal of their idea and again as an appraisal of 
their completed story. Both measures used a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 {strongly 
agree). Six items from this scale were used to compute a measure of creativity of the 
story idea or of the completed story. This measure consisted of a summation of ratings of 
the idea (or completed story) as original, creative, novel, clever, ingenious, and insightful. 
Additionally, a variable assessing the degree to which participants felt their idea (or the
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completed story) was organic was computed using the summation of three self-rated 
items describing the degree to which the idea was organic, natural, and authentic.
Inspiration. A three-item measure of inspiration was completed twice after the 
story writing task: once to assess inspiration at the moment of getting an idea and again to 
assess inspiration while writing the story. Participants responded using a seven-point 
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).
Effort. A three-item measure of effort was completed twice after the story writing 
task: once to assess effort in getting an idea for the story and again to assess effort while 
writing the story. Participants responded using a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree).
Attributions o f idea and story origins. A six-item scale was completed twice after 
the story completion task: once to assess the role of three possible origins of the idea, and 
again to assess the role o f those three origins in the writing process. Each origin was 
composed of two items: conscious sources (conscious mind, unconscious thought), 
unconscious sources (unconscious or subconscious mind, nonconscious source deep 
within), or spiritual sources (supernatural or spiritual force, spiritual or transcendent 
influence). Participants responded using an identical seven-point Likert scale previously 
described.
Demographic Information. Standard demographic information was collected 
including sex, age, and ethnicity. Self-reports o f verbal and math scores for the 
Standardized Aptitude Test (SAT) were collected as an assessment verbal ability. 
Participants also indicated whether or not English was their first language learned and
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primary language of use, and rated the perceived difficulty of the writing task and 
whether or not they produced a complete story.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Preliminary analysis revealed no significant main effects of sex or significant 
interactions between sex and condition (see Table 1).
Manipulation check. No significant effects were found using a regression to test 
whether or not condition predicted either attributions of story ideas to unconscious 
sources (see Table 2). This preliminary result suggests that the manipulation may have 
been unsuccessful. Thus, the following analyses involving the manipulation must be 
interpreted with caution given the failed manipulation check.
Condition effects
Three condition contrasts were used to perform regression analyses to assess the 
effect of the manipulation on the creativity task: control condition versus all other 
conditions, unconscious thought conditions (1- and 2-back) versus conscious thought 
condition, and 2-back condition versus 1-back condition. Regression analyses revealed no 
significant relationship between condition and a self-rating of creativity of the completed 
story (see Table 3). Additionally, there was no significant relationship between condition 
and a self-rating of the creativity of the story idea (see Table 4). No significant 
relationship was found between condition and inspiration either when getting an idea for 
the story (see Table 5) or writing the story (see Table 6). Thus, the hypothesis that 
unconscious thought conditions would produce more feelings of inspiration and higher
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self-ratings of creativity was not supported. This finding led to more in-depth exploratory 
probing to investigate the reasons for the failure of the experimental manipulation. 
Exploratory analyses
Affect and Idea Appraisal. Three identical condition contrasts were used to 
perform regression analyses to investigate the lack of effect o f manipulation on the 
creativity task. Regression results revealed two significant effects of condition. First, the 
contrast of experimental conditions versus control condition significantly predicted lower 
ratings of positive affect at the moment of getting an idea, P = -.22, p  < 0.05. This finding 
indicates that the control condition had higher ratings of positive affect (M  = 29.42) 
relative to the conscious thought condition (M  = 26.69), the 1-back condition (M=24.45), 
and the 2-back condition (M  = 24.35; see Figure 1). Second, an identical contrast showed 
a significant difference in appraisal of the idea as organic as a result of manipulation 
conditions versus controls, P = -.21 ,p <  0.05. Again, this indicates that the control 
condition had a higher mean self-rating of the idea as organic (M =  13.06) versus the 
conscious thought condition (M ~  11.66), the 2-back condition (M = 11.55), and the 1- 
back condition (M  =10.78; see Figure 2).
Personality Traits. Regression analyses using identical contrasts described above 
were performed to test moderating effects of NEO-FFI personality traits on the 
relationship between creativity and unconscious thought and inspiration and unconscious 
thought, respectively. The contrast of all experimental conditions versus the control 
condition revealed a significant interaction effect with NEO-FFI Neuroticism, such that 
those high on neuroticism were especially responsive to the conscious thought, 1 -back,
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and 2-back conditions when rating inspiration at the moment o f getting the idea for their 
story, p = -.19,/? < 0.05.
Using the regression formula, predicted values based on high and low self-rated 
NEO-FFI neuroticism were calculated for self-rated inspiration at the moment of getting 
an idea for each experimental condition. Individuals high in neuroticism tended to report 
lower mean ratings of inspiration in the 1-back (M  = 10.21), the conscious thought (M = 
8.95), and the 2-back (M  = 8.38) conditions than in the control condition (M = 12.12). 
Individuals low in neuroticism report similar ratings of inspiration across the conscious 
thought (M  = 11.75), 2-back (M = 11.44), 1-back (M  = 9.28), and in the control 
condition (M  = 10.04; see Figure 3).
Perceived Competence. Regression analyses were performed to determine 
whether perceived competence and experience in writing in general and fictional writing 
moderated self-ratings of creativity and inspiration. Although neither self-ratings of 
c. competence or experience in writing significantly predicted self-ratings of creativity or 
inspiration, a pattern approaching significance was found for the influence of an 
interaction of an unconscious versus conscious condition contrast and perceived 
competence at writing on a self-rating of creativity of the completed story, p -  0.16,/? = 
0.08.
Using the regression formula, predicted values for high and low perceived writing 
competence were calculated for each experimental condition. The control condition 
produced the highest self-ratings of creativity in high and low competence individuals. In 
those participants with high self-rated competence, creativity ratings for the 1-back 
(21.25) and 2-back (22.76) conditions were higher than that o f the conscious thought
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condition (19.76) (see Figure 4). A different pattern was observed for participants with 
low self-rated writing competence, such that creativity ratings were highest in the 
conscious thought condition (19.92) relative to the 1-back (17.76) and 2-back (15.65) 
conditions (see Figure 4).
Expert Ratings o f  Creativity
Past research has shown that self-ratings of creativity are more highly correlated 
with ratings of inspiration and unconscious attributions than are peer-ratings (Thrash & 
Cassidy, in preparation). Additionally, self-reports consistently predict peer reports of 
creativity. Because preliminary analyses showed no effect of manipulation on self-ratings 
of creativity and inspiration, I determined that peer ratings of creativity were even less 
likely to support the hypotheses than self-ratings. Additionally, accurate coding of 
completed stories would necessitate the employment of English majors as qualified 
coders. Given the limited budgeting resources for this study, expert ratings of creativity 
were not collected.
Attributions o f  Idea to Unconscious Thought
Although the experimental conditions used in this study were not effective in 
manipulating conscious and unconscious thought, the mediational model could still be 
tested using the measured attribution of the source of the main story idea in place of 
condition. Following Baron and Kenny’s (1986) three steps for establishing a mediational 
model, a series of two regressions was performed to assess whether inspiration mediated 
the relationship between attributions o f idea to unconscious sources and appraisal of the 
idea as creative. Each analysis includes all three condition contrast codes in order to
29
control for the effects of experimental condition, which are not relevant for this particular 
analysis.
In the first step, I entered the three contrast codes (any experimental condition vs. 
control, unconscious thought conditions vs. conscious thought condition, and 1-back 
condition vs. 2-back condition) and attribution of story idea to an unconscious source as 
predictors of the self-appraisal of creativity. Attribution of idea to an unconscious source 
was the only significant predictor of self-rated creativity of the completed story, p = 0.29, 
p  < 0.001. Next, inspiration at the moment of getting a story idea was used as an outcome 
variable, with the three contrast codes and attribution of idea to unconscious sources 
again used as predictors. Attribution of story idea to unconscious sources was the only 
significant predictor of inspiration at the moment of getting a story idea, p = 0.30, p  < 
0.001. In the second step, inspiration at the moment o f getting an idea was included in 
addition to all variables from step one as predictors of the self-appraisal of creativity. 
Inspiration at the moment of getting an idea was the only significant predictor o f self- 
rated creativity o f the completed story, p = 0.51, p  < 0.001. Additionally, when 
inspiration was added as a predictor of self-rated creativity, the relationship between 
attributions of idea to unconscious sources and self-rated creativity was no longer 
significant, p = 0.12, n.s (see Figure 5). These findings lend compelling support to the 
mediational model of creativity proposed in the current study.
Discussion
The hypothesis that unconscious thought would produce increased self-ratings of 
creativity and inspiration was not supported by the results of analyses based on 
experimental condition. A contrast comparing all manipulation conditions (1-back, 2-
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back, and conscious thought) to the control condition (immediate completion) revealed 
significantly lower positive affect and ratings of the idea as organic in all manipulation 
conditions relative to the control condition. More specifically, participants in the control 
condition reported the highest positive affect and participants in the unconscious thought 
conditions reported the lowest positive affect. Additionally, NEO-FFI Neuroticism scores 
interacted with condition such that higher neuroticism lowered inspiration at the time of 
generating a story idea for those in the 2-back and conscious thought conditions. Neither 
self-rated competence nor experience in writing predicted self-rated creativity, 
inspiration, or decreased effort. A pattern approaching significance was observed for the 
influence o f the interaction o f perceived competence in writing and an unconscious vs. 
conscious thought contrast on self-ratings of creativity of stories. In contrast, exploratory 
analyses provided support for the meditational model when controlling for the effects of 
condition, such that attributions of the idea to unconscious sources significantly predicted 
inspiration, which significantly predicted self-rated creativity.
Significant changes in positive affect as a result o f  condition
Positive affect correlates highly with both self-ratings o f creativity and 
inspiration. Frederickson and Branigan (2005) compared primed positive and negative 
emotion states to neutral emotion states. They found that positive emotions broadened the 
scope of attention to encompass a global focus whereas negative emotion states narrowed 
the focus of attention. Further, they found that negative emotion states narrow attention 
toward specific action tendencies (i.e. run away in fear, attack in anger) and the 
mobilization of the appropriate physical response. Conversely, positive emotional states 
broaden activation of action tendencies, producing significantly more action tendencies
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than either negative or neutral emotion states, suggesting a corresponding broadening of 
cognitive processes, most specifically associations between thought and action.
The pattern o f results observed in analysis of positive affect and condition 
supports Frederickson’s (2001) broaden and build theory, which states that the differing 
effects of emotional states on attention is an evolved complementary function. Negative 
emotions narrow attentional focus to specific action tendencies because they more closely 
correspond with active threats in the environment whereas positive emotions broaden 
thought-action repertoires, inspiring individuals to pursue a broader range of thoughts, 
actions, and associations than they would in either neutral or negative states 
(Frederickson, 2001). Positive emotions may further serve to build up personal resources 
over time, in effect creating positive psychological conditions that outlast the emotional 
states in which they were developed. More specifically, it may increase resources such as 
physical health, social resources, intellectual resources, and may foster certain 
psychological processes, most notably creativity (Frederickson, 2001).
Thus, significantly lower ratings of positive affect in unconscious thought 
conditions and conscious thought conditions relative to the control condition is a likely 
explanation of the failure o f the manipulation conditions. These results suggest that any 
condition in which participants were asked to wait a period of time before expressing 
their ideas had a negative effect on the subsequent writing task and self-ratings of 
positive affect. There are multiple explanations for this effect. First, perhaps requiring 
participants to wait to express their idea, either by conscious planning or by distracting 
them from thought, frustrated them enough to negatively influence positive affect.
Indeed, the corresponding low self-attributions of the idea as organic in manipulation
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conditions could be the result of a similar process. Restricting the flow of the creative 
process in a contrived laboratory setting may have decreased the feeling that ideas 
originated from a natural source. The disruption caused by the forced delay of idea 
expression could account for both findings.
Second, the distraction task used in the unconscious thought conditions could 
have been the source of additional differences in positive affect between unconscious and 
conscious thought conditions. We included both the 1-back and 2-back tasks in an effort 
to assess different levels of potential cognitive stress and frustration due to the 
challenging nature o f the tasks. Indeed, results support the idea of differing effects of the 
two n-back tasks. Although not significant, self-ratings of positive affect were slightly 
lower in the 2-back task compared to the 1 -back task. Interestingly, the decrease in 
positive affect in the conscious thought condition was less than the decrease in positive 
affect seen in the unconscious thought conditions, relative to controls. These results could 
indicate increasing decrements in positive affect, and increasing levels of frustration, as a 
result of increasingly difficult and cognitively taxing tasks.
Significant interaction o f  NEO-FFI Neuroticism and condition moderates self-rated 
inspiration
The significant interaction of neuroticism and manipulation conditions on self- 
ratings of inspiration has interesting implications for the effects o f personality traits on 
state-level inspiration. Participants with high neuroticism reported less inspiration in both 
the conscious thought and 2-back conditions, suggesting that both highly focused thought 
and highly taxing tasks will negatively impact the ability of highly neurotic individuals to 
become inspired. In contrast, those participants reporting low neuroticism displayed
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equally high ratings of inspiration at the moment of getting an idea in both the conscious 
thought and 2-back conditions, suggesting some benefit for both focused thought and 
unconscious thought during distraction. Additionally, the magnitude of difference 
between high and low neuroticism participants was greatest in the 2-back condition (see 
Figure 5). Neuroticism has been linked to simplistic thinking styles, high adherence to 
norms, and low self-awareness (Zhang & Huang, 2001). To the extent that inspiration 
necessitates an awareness of one’s own internal states, and to the extent that creativity 
requires departure from norms and complex cognitions, neuroticism could be a negative 
influence on both. Future research should continue to investigate the effects of 
personality traits on state-level inspiration, affect, and creativity.
Interaction o f  self-rated competence and condition moderates self-rated creativity.
Self-ratings of writing competence interacted with condition to moderate the 
relationship between unconscious thought and self-ratings o f inspiration, a result that was 
marginally significant. In the control condition, those participants rating themselves as 
highly competent at writing also produced higher predicted self-ratings of creativity of 
their completed stories. Participants in the conscious thought condition produced virtually 
identical self-ratings of creativity regardless of self-rated writing competence. Highly 
competent writers again produced higher self-ratings o f creativity in both the 1- and 2- 
back tasks, an effect that increased in magnitude from 1- to 2-back condition. This pattern 
of results shows that, for those individuals who have self-perceived competence in 
writing, the pattern predicted both by Dijksterhuis and colleagues’ (2006) previous 
research and by the mediational model of creativity proposed does occur. Conversely, 
unconscious thought exerted progressively negative effects on the self-rated creativity of
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individuals with low writing competence. These results suggest an important role for 
perceived competence in moderating the benefits of unconscious thought on creativity.
Indeed, extensive research has shown that individuals with high perceived 
competence are more likely to accept the challenges of tasks and exhibit persistent effort 
to complete tasks, generally leading to increased performance relative to low perceived 
competence individuals (Elliot & Dweck, 1988; Leondari & Gialamas, 2002). On the 
other hand, those with low perceived competence generally perform worse on tasks 
relative to high competence individuals, and additionally show higher levels of negative 
affect and lower levels of persistence during task completion (Elliot & Dweck, 1988). It 
is possible that individuals with high self-perceived writing competence have more 
experience with writing. More specifically, they may have higher competence as a direct 
result of more experience which may have allowed them to engage in more frequent 
incubation. Thus, they may be more used to engaging in unconscious thought during the 
writing process. As a consequence, these individuals may benefit more from unconscious 
thought as a function of being better at unconscious thought because of increased levels 
of practice.
Although results indicate that the manipulation used here was not effective, there 
was strong support for the proposed mediational model independent of conditions. 
Attributions of the idea to unconscious sources strongly predicted self-ratings of the 
creativity of the main story idea. When self-rated inspiration was taken into 
consideration, it was strongly predicted by attributions o f idea to unconscious sources and 
in turn strongly predicted creativity of the story idea, after which the relationship between 
attributions of the idea to unconscious sources and creativity was no longer significant
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(see Figure 5). This pattern o f results strongly suggests that the processes posited by the 
current model did indeed occur within individuals, and provides more evidence that the 
primary problem with the current study was a failure of the experimental manipulation 
and not an absence of the effect itself
Although many explanations exist regarding the failure of the unconscious and 
conscious thought manipulations in the current study, the existence of the phenomenon 
characterized by Dijksterhuis and colleagues (2006) and proposed here in the mediational 
model was supported by subsequent analyses. Interestingly, the pattern o f expected 
results predicted by the proposed model was found when the experimental manipulation 
was controlled for. This pattern provides a strong foundation for future study of the 
relationship between unconscious thought processes, inspiration, and creativity. It is 
possible that using a different distraction task, thereby minimizing decreases in positive 
affect, may be sufficient to show the desired effect. Future research should labor to 
identify more suitable ways to effectively manipulate conscious and unconscious thought. 
The mediated model proposed here, if  validated in the future, would be an important and 
meaningful progression in our understanding of the processes driving human innovation.
Appendix A: Full description of n-back tasks as viewed by participants 
In the 1-back task, you will be presented with a series o f one-digit numbers, one at a time. 
After seeing each number, you will be asked whether it matches the number that came 
before it. For example, imagine that you are shown the following sequence of numbers, 
one at a time: 4, 4, 6, 5, 3, 3, 7, 9, 7. After being shown the second number (4), you 
would be asked whether it matches the number that preceded it (4). The correct answer 
would be "Match," because 4 matches 4. Then, after being shown the third number (6), 
the correct answer would be "No Match," because the 6 doesn't match the 4 that preceded 
it. In this example, the correct answer for all remaining numbers would be "No Match," 
except for the sixth number (3), which matches the 3 that preceded it. Please press 
"Continue” to try a practice 1-back task.
The 2-back task works exactly like the 1-back task with one key difference: for each 
number, you will indicate whether it matches the number that came TWO before it. For 
example, imagine that you are shown the following sequence of numbers, one at a time:
4, 6, 4, 5, 3, 8, 7, 9, 7. After being shown the third number (4), you would be asked 
whether it matches the number that came two before it (4). The correct answer would be 
"Match," because 4 matches 4. Then, after being shown the next number (5), the correct 
answer would be "No Match," because the 5 doesn't match the 6 that came two before it. 
In this example, the correct answer for all remaining numbers would be "No Match," 
except for the final number (7), which matches the 7 that came two before it. Please press 
"Continue" to try a practice 2-back task.
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Appendix 2: Beginning of story task as viewed by participants 
John and Maria walked through town on a summer evening, hand in hand. It was their 
third date. As they were passing a house next to the lake, they stopped, alarmed by a 
sound coming from inside the house. Immediately they knew that the evening had taken a 
turn in a direction that they could not have anticipated.
38
References
Baer, M., & Oldham, G.R. (2006). The curvilinear relation between experienced creative 
time pressure and creativity: Moderating effects o f openness to experience and 
support for creativity. Journal o f Applied Psychology, 91, 963-970.
Baron, R.M., & Kenny, D.A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in
social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. 
Journal o f  Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182.
Bhattacharya, J., & Petsche, H. (2005). Drawing on a mind’s canvas: Differences in 
cortical integration patterns between artists and non-artists. Human Brain 
Mapping, 26, 1-14.
Bowden, E.M., & Jung Beeman, M. (1998). Getting the right idea: Semantic activation in 
the right hemisphere may help solve insight problems. Psychological Science, 9, 
435-440.
Czikszentmihalyi, M., & Sawyer, K. (1995). Creative insight: The social dimension of a 
solitary moment. In R. J. Steinberg & J.E. Davidson (Eds.), The nature o f  insight 
(pp. 329-361). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dijksterhuis, A. (2004). Think different: The merits o f unconscious thought in preference 
development and decision making. Journal o f  Personality and Social Psychology, 
87, 586-598.
Dijksterhuis, A., Bos, M.W., Nordgren, L.F., & van Baaren, R.B. (2006). On making the 
right choice: The deliberation without attention effect. Science, 311, 1005-1007.
Dijksterhuis, A., & Meurs, T. (2006). Where creativity resides: The generative power of 
unconscious thought. Consciousness and Cognition, 15, 135-146.
39
Dijksterhuis, A., & Nordgren, L.F. (2006). A theory of unconscious thought. Perspectives 
on Psychological Science, 1, 95-109.
Dijksterhuis, A., & van Olden, Z. (2006). On the benefits o f thinking unconsciously: 
Unconscious thought can increase post-choice satisfaction. Journal o f  
Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 627-631.
Eindhoven, J.E., & Vinacke, W.E. (1952). Creative processes in painting. The Journal o f  
General Psychology, 47, 139-164.
Elliot, A.J., & Dweck, C. (1988). Goals: An approach to motivation and achievement. 
Journal o f  Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 5-12.
Frederickson, B.L., & Branigan, C. (2005). Positive emotions broaden the scope of 
attention and thought-action repertoires. Cognition and Emotion, 19, 313-332.
Freud, S. (1958). The unconscious. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Transl.), The standard edition o f  
the complete psychological works o f  Sigmund Freud (pp. 159-215). London: 
Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1966). Project for a scientific psychology. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The 
standard edition o f  the complete psychological works o f  Sigmund Freud (pp. 283- 
413). London: Hogarth.
Goel, V., & Vartanian, O. (2005). Dissociating the roles o f the right ventrolateral and 
dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex in generation and maintenance o f hypotheses in 
set-shift problems. Cerebral Cortex, 15, 1170-1177
Grabner, R.H., Fink, A., & Neubauer, A.C. (2007). Brain correlates of self-rated
originality of ideas: Evidence event-related power and phase-locking changes in 
the EEG. Behavioral Neuroscience, 121, 224-230.
40
Holt, R.R. (1977). A method for assessing primary process manifestations and their 
control in Rorschach responses. In M. Rickers-Ovsiankina (Ed.), Rorschach 
psychology (pp. 375-420). New York: Krieger.
Howard-Jones, P.A., Blakemore, S.J., Samuel, E.A., Summers, I.R., & Claxton, G.
(2005). Semantic divergence and creative story generation: An fMRI 
investigation. Cognitive Brain Research, 25, 240-250.
Jonides, J., Schumacher, E.H., Smith, E.E., Lauber, E.J., Awh, E., Minoshima, S., & 
Koeppe, R.A. (1997). Verbal working memory load affects regional brain 
activation as measured by PET. Journal o f  Cognitive Neuroscience, 9, 462-475.
Kaplan, C.A., & Simon, H.A. (1990). In search of insight. Cognitive Psychology, 22, 
374-419.
Kelly, K.E. (2006). Relationship between the five-factor model o f personality and the 
scale of creative attributes and behavior: A validational study. Individual 
Differences Research, 4, 299-305.
Kris, E. (1952). Psychoanalytic exploration in art. New York: International University 
Press.
Leonardi, A., & Gialamas, V. (2002). Implicit theories, goal orientations, and perceived 
competence: Impact on students’ achievement behavior. Psychology in the 
Schools, 39, 279-291.
Luo, J., & Niki, K. (2003). Function of hippocampus in “insight” of problem solving. 
Hippocampus, 13, 316-323.
Martindale, C. (1989). Personality, situation, and creativity. In J. Glover, R. Ronning, & 
C.R. Reynolds (Eds.), Handbook o f  creativity (pp. 211-232). New York: Plenum.
Martindale, C., & Dailey, A. (1996). Creativity: Primary process cognition and 
personality. Personality and Individual Differences, 20, 409-414.
Russ, S. (2001). Primary process thinking and creativity: Affect and cognition. Creativity 
Research Journal, 13, 27-35.
Schooler, J.W., Ohlsson, S., & Brooks, K. (1993). Thoughts beyond words: When
language overshadows insight. Journal o f  Experimental Psychology, 122, 166- 
183.
Seger, C.A., Desmon, J.E., Glover, G.H., & Gabrieli, J.D.E. (2000). Functional magnetic 
resonance imaging evidence for right-hemisphere involvement in processing 
unusual semantic relationships. Neuropsychology, 14, 361-369.
Simonton, D.K. (1999). Creativity and genius. In L.A. Pervin & O.P. John (Eds.),
j
Handbook o f  personality: Theory and research (2 ed)(pp. 629-652). New York: 
Guilford Press.
Thrash, T.M., & Elliot, A J. (2004). Inspiration: Core characteristics, component 
processes, antecedents, and function. Journal o f  Personality and Social 
Psychology, 87, 957-973.
Thrash, T.M., & Elliot, A.J. (2003). Inspiration as a psychological construct. Journal o f  
Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 871-889.
Wallas, G. (1926). The art o f  thought. New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Company.
Wilson, T.D., Lisle, D., Schooler, J.W., Hodges, S.D., Klaaren, K.J., & LaFleur, S J . 
(1993). Introspecting about reasons can reduce post-choice satisfaction. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 331-339.
Wilson, T.D., & Schooler, J.W. (1991). Thinking too much: Introspection can reduce the 
quality o f preferences and decisions. Journal o f  Personality and Social 
Psychology, 60, 181-192.
Wolfradt, U., & Pretz, J.E. (2001). Individual differences in creativity: Personality, story 
writing, and hobbies. European Journal o f  Personality, 15, 297-310.
Wycoff, E.B., & Pryor, B. (2003). Cognitive processing, creativity, apprehension, and the 
humorous personality. North American Journal o f  Psychology, 5, 31-44.
Zhang, L., & Huang, J. (2001). Thinking styles and the five-factor model o f personality. 
European Journal o f  Personality, 465-476.
43
Table 1
Moderation o f  se lf ratings o f  inspiration and creativity by sex and interaction o f  sex and 
condition.
P t P
Inspiration while writing
sex -0.10 -1.07 0.29
sex X contrast 1 -0.20 -0.70 0.49
sex X contrast 2 0.41 1.40 0.16
sex X contrast 3 -0.50 -1.64 0.10
Inspiration at the moment o f  getting an idea
sex -0.08 -0.90 0.37
sex X contrast 1 -0.18 -0.62 0.54
sex X contrast 2 0.33 1.10 0.27
sex X contrast 3 -0.29 -0.95 0.35
Six-item rating o f  creativity o f  completed story
sex -0.15 -1.64 0.10
sex X contrast 1 0.01 0.04 0.97
sex X contrast 2 0.21 0.71 0.48
sex X contrast 3 -0.31 -1.02 0.31
Note: sex = main effect of sex; contrast 1 = interaction of sex and condition contrast of 
any experimental condition vs. control condition; contrast 2 = interaction of sex and 
condition contrast of unconscious thought conditions (1- and 2-back) vs. conscious 
thought condition; contrast 3 = interaction of sex and condition contrast of 2-back 
condition vs. 1-back condition.
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Table 2
Condition contrasts predicting attributions o f  story idea to unconscious sources
P t P
Contrast 1 -0.00 -0.04 0.97
Contrast 2 -0.04 -0.40 0.69
Contrast 3 -0.05 -0.51 0.61
Note: contrast 1 = any experimental condition vs. control condition; contrast 2 =
unconscious thought conditions (1-back and 2-back) vs. conscious thought condition;
contrast 3 = 2-back condition vs. 1-back condition.
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Table 3
P t P
Contrast 1 -0.10 -1.09 0.28
Contrast 2 -0.03 -0.32 0.75
Contrast 3 -0.02 -0.20 0.84
Note: contrast 1 = any experimental condition vs. control condition; contrast 2 =
unconscious thought conditions (1-back and 2-back) vs. conscious thought condition;
contrast 3 = 2-back condition vs. 1-back condition.
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Table 4
Conditional contrasts predicting a six-item self-rating o f  creativity o f  story idea
P t P
Contrast 1 -0.08 -0.92 0.33
Contrast 2 -0.06 -0.66 0.51
Contrast 3 -0.01 -0.11 0.91
Note: contrast 1 = any experimental condition vs. control condition; contrast 2 =
unconscious thought conditions (1-back and 2-back) vs. conscious thought condition;
contrast 3 = 2-back condition vs. 1-back condition.
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Table 5
Condition contrasts predicting inspiration at the moment o f  getting story idea
P t P
Contrast 1 -0.10 -1.10 0.27
Contrast 2 -0.08 -0.91 0.37
Contrast 3 -0.02 -0.21 0.84
Note: contrast 1 = any experimental condition vs. control condition; contrast 2 =
unconscious thought conditions (1-back and 2-back) vs. conscious thought condition;
contrast 3 = 2-back condition vs. 1-back condition.
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Table 6
Condition contrasts predicting self-ratings o f  inspiration while writing
P t P
Contrast 1 -0.12 -1.32 0.19
Contrast 2 -0.08 -0.91 0.37
Contrast 3 0.02 0.21 0.83
Note: contrast 1 = any experimental condition vs. control condition; contrast 2 =
unconscious thought conditions (1-back and 2-back) vs. conscious thought condition;
contrast 3 = 2-back condition vs. 1-back condition.
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Figure captions
Figure 1. Graph of self-rated positive affect at the moment o f getting an idea for the story 
as a function of condition.
Figure 2. Graph of self-rated appraisal of the story idea as organic as a function of 
condition.
Figure 3. Graph of predicted values for self-appraisal of story idea as creative as a 
function of the interaction between NEO-FFI neuroticism and condition.
Figure 4. Graph of predicted values for self-rated inspiration at the moment of getting an 
idea for the story as a function of the interaction between self-rated competence and 
condition.
Figure 5. Steps 1 and 2 for establishing the mediation of the relationship between 
attributions of story idea to unconscious sources and creativity by inspiration.
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Step 1
Unconscious p=0.29** Creativity
Thought
Step 2
p=0.12 n.s. CreativityUnconscious
Thought
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Note: ** = significant at the 0.001 level; *** = significant at the 0.0001 level
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